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In sickness but not in wealth: 
όield evidence on patients’ risk preferences in the financial and health domain 
 
Abstract: We present results from a hypothetical framed field experiment assessing whether 
risk preferences significantly differ across the health and financial domains when they are 
elicited through the same multiple price list paired-lottery method. We consider a sample of 
300 patients attending outpatient clinics in a university hospital in Athens, during the Greek 
financial crisis. Risk preferences in finance are elicited using paired-lottery questions with 
hypothetical payments. The questions are adapted to the health domain by framing the 
lotteries as risky treatments in hypothetical healthcare scenarios. Using Maximum 
Likelihood methods, we estimate the degree of risk aversion, allowing for the estimates to 
be dependent on domain and individual characteristics. The subjects in our sample, who 
were exposed to both health and financial distress, tend to be less risk averse in the financial 
than in the health domain.  
 
Key words: Behavioral experiments in health; Field experiments; Risk aversion. 
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Introduction 
We report the results from a hypothetical framed field experiment in the sense of Harrison 
and List (1) (that is, an experiment with non-student subjects making decisions in a field 
context) with 300 patients attending outpatient clinics in a Greek hospital during the current 
economic crisis. We elicit their risk preferences within both financial and health domains 
using the multiple price list (MPL) paired-lottery method of Holt and Laury (2) with 
hypothetical payments, and we test the hypothesis that risk preferences differ across 
domains.  
 
This research is motivated by the need to test different methods of measuring risk 
preferences in health. Despite previous attempts (3,4), there is currently no ‘goldΝstandard’Ν
metric for risk preferences in health. In addition, the evidence on how risk preferences 
correlate across the health and financial domains is scant. Very few risk preference measures 
have been tested in healthcare settings with real patients. 
  
Testing different measures of risk preferences in health and across domains is of key interest 
for research and policy purposes for three main reasons. First, it may allow a better 
understanding of how patients make healthcare decisions and adhere to them. Second, it may 
contribute to the validity of cost-effectiveness analysis and decision-making models where 
risk preferences are considered. Third, direct evidence on the tradeoff of risks across wealth 
and health sheds light on the willingness to enroll in voluntary health insurance. 
 
In this study we explore the possibility of measuring risk preferences in finance and health 
using the MPL method. Together with the Binswanger (5,6) and the Gneezy and Potters (7) 
methods, the Holt and Laury (2) MPL method is one of the most widely used incentive-
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compatible methods to measure risk preferences over monetary outcomes. In this method 
subjects are asked to choose the option they prefer in a series of pairs of lotteries involving 
different risk-outcome tradeoffs. We use the Holt and Laury (2) MPL test with hypothetical, 
rather than incentive-compatible, rewards, and calculate risk preferences in finance and 
health within subjects. 
 
We do so by considering subjects attending outpatient clinics in a hospital in Greece during 
the current economic recession. Such subjects find themselves withinΝaΝ‘naturallyΝoccurring’Ν
state of both financial and health distress. This context improves the likelihood of 
respondents perceiving the risky trade-offs as realistic and vivid even in the absence of 
actual incentive-compatible consequences for their responses. To the best of our knowledge, 
ours is the first study to elicit the risk preferences of a relatively large pool of subjects (n = 
300) in both the financial and the health domain using the same MPL paired-lottery 
measure.  
 
Our main finding is that risk preferences differ across the health and the financial domains 
even when they are elicited through the same MPL measure: our sample of Greek patients 
manifested higher risk aversion in health.  
 
Background: measuring risk preferences in health and across domains. 
The issue of whether preferences are stable is a central question among economists, 
psychologists, and ‘appliedΝbehavioralΝscientists’Ν(inΝtheΝsenseΝofΝKahnemanΝ(8)). Preference 
stability tends to be assessed at two levels: over time, and across different domains in life at 
a given point in time.1 Our research relates to the latter. There are six main approaches to 
                                                 
1
 Economists often distinguish between unconditional and conditional stability of risk preferences (9). 
Unconditional stability postulates that risk aversion literally remains constant over time. According to 
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measure risk preferences in health. The first approach uses insurance market choices (INS) 
to infer underlying risk preferences (16–18). Few recent articles have looked at choices 
across different insurance contracts to assess risk preferences across different life domains 
(19,20). 
 
A second approachΝ usesΝ ‘risky’Ν healthΝ behavior such as smoking, heavy drinking, or not 
using seat belts as indirect proxies for risk preferences. In this behavior-proxy (BP) strategy, 
which has been widely used (21–23), risk preferences are indirectly inferred from observed 
behavior rather than being directly measured. A third approach assumes that risk taking is 
inherently domain-specific, and should therefore be measured by domain-specific 
questionnaires (DS) such as the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT), the Risk 
Propensity Questionnaire, and the Risk Propensity Scale (24–26). Although DS measures 
may be constructed to address health behaviors (27,28), a disadvantage of this approach is 
that risk preferences are not directly measured but are inferred from self-reported 
engagementΝ inΝ ‘risky’Νbehaviors. The fourth approach, a simplified variant of the third, is 
based on self-assessed willingness to take risk generally and in specific domains using 
Likert scales (29). This scale-based self-assessed (SB-SA) approach is simple and scores 
can be quantitatively compared across domains. However, the theoretical foundations of this 
‘direct scaling’Ν approachΝ areΝ unclearΝ (3), and the evidence on how the SB-SA scores 
correlate with other risk preference measures and across different domains is mixed (29–31). 
Two common features of approaches two, three and four are that i) they are not incentive-
compatible, in the sense that the measures are merely hypothetical and they bear no real 
                                                                                                                                                      
conditional stability, however, what remains constant over time is the function that links the risk aversion with 
the observable states of nature. Conditional stability, a weaker concept of stability of preferences, is actually 
commonΝamongΝeconomists,ΝwhoΝalsoΝreferΝtoΝitΝasΝ‘state-dependentΝpreferences’Ν(10,11). There are very few 
studies looking at the stability of preferences over time for representative samples of the population (e.g., 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (9) and Harrison and Lau (12) in Denmark). Other studies have 
typically looked at shorter time horizons (13), relatively small numbers of repeated observations (14) and/or 
very specific, not representative, pools of subjects (15). 
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consequences to subjects, and ii) they involve purely self-reported scale measures rather 
than explicit tradeoffs.  
 
The fifth approach encompasses a family of methods that measure risk preferences in health 
with tasks involving explicit trade-offs, rather than self-reported scales.2 Within this trade-
off approach a common method is the certainty equivalent (CE) method (3)(4,32). Of direct 
interest here, Prosser and Wittenberg (4) elicit CE in both health and money lotteries for 
multiple sclerosis patients and members of the general public. The proxy for risk preferences 
is the value of the CE, defined as the smallest amount of dollars or relapse-free days the 
respondent would be willing to accept instead of the lottery presented. Both groups of 
respondents were significantly risk averse for small and large monetary outcomes, but risk 
neutral with respect to health outcomes. Similar results were obtained by Warshawsky-
Livne et al. (33). CE questions have also been included in surveys such as the US Health and 
Retirement Survey, with mixed evidence on their links with other risk preference measures 
and with risky health behaviors (34,35). Other methods within this trade-off approach are 
the probability equivalent (PE) method, which is also at the heart of the standard gamble 
(SG) method commonly used to measure utilities of health states, and the gamble tradeoff 
(GTO) method (3,36). 
 
The final approach to measure risk preferences in health uses incentive-compatible (IC) tests 
involving real rewards to respondents. Similarly to what found in other areas, experimental 
economists have documented a ‘hypotheticalΝ responseΝ bias’ in the elicitation of risk 
preferences, with hypothetical methods showing significantly less risk aversion than 
                                                 
2
 A comprehensive methodological discussion of these various trade-off approaches to measure risk 
preferences can be found in Wakker and Deneffe (3). Here we only briefly review the key tradeoff approaches 
applied to risk preferences in health. Notice that all the trade-off methods mentioned here can be incentive-
compatible when applied in measuring risk preferences for monetary outcomes. 
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methods with real rewards (2,37–40). Since measuring risk preferences in health with real 
health consequences is challenging, most studies employing IC methods offer monetary 
rewards, rather than health rewards, and compare elicited risk preferences to health 
behaviors, again with mixed results (30,41–43). 
 
The three most common IC measurement procedures for risk preferences for monetary 
outcomes are the ones proposed by Binswanger (5,6), Gneezy and Potters (7), and Holt and 
Laury (2) (HL) (44). The HL method uses a multiple price list (MPL) design which presents 
a series of questions, each reproducing a choice between two lotteries (2,45). The HL MPL 
method fully accounts for an individual being risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking, 
whereas the other two IC methods cannot empirically distinguish between risk neutrality and 
risk seeking. A second major advantage is that the HL method allows the researcher to 
structurally estimate the underlying risk preferences. In particular, the behavioral 
econometrics approach by Harrison and Rutström (46) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström (47,48) uses Maximum Likelihood (ML) to estimate the risk aversion parameters 
assuming a range of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and non-EUT models (see Online 
Appendix C). 
 
In Table 1, we summarize the key studies that compare risk preferences across different 
domains. We briefly report their design; the methods; whether the rewards were hypothetical 
or real; the compared domains; their samples and settings; and their main findings, in 
particular whether they found consistent risk preferences across different domains. Not only 
is there a broad range of methods used in the literature, but also the evidence of risk 
preference stability across domains is mixed. Most studies have used hypothetical rewards, 
and few used either IC tests or actual insurance choices. Among the hypothetical tests, the 
CE method is most common, while the HL MPL method prevails among the IC methods. 
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With the exception of Wakker and Deneffe (3) and Harrison, List and Towe (49), most 
studies use a within-subjects design, with a broad heterogeneity of domains across which 
risk preferences are compared. Results are difficult to compare due to the high heterogeneity 
of samples, methods, and study designs. However, there is general evidence that there are 
differences across domains and that these also emerge when real consequences are at stake, 
for the studies using either the MPL or the INS approaches.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The approach undertaken in the present work aims to bridge the gap between the fifth and 
the sixth approaches. As with the sixth approach, we use the MPL method and structurally 
estimate the risk preferences across the domains. On the other hand, similarly to the fifth 
approach we consider only hypothetical rather than real rewards. This was mainly due to the 
ethical and logistical constraints from operating in our outpatient clinic settings as well as 
the intention to minimize confounders across the two domains. Our study is 
methodologically close to the approach by Riddel (50) who compares risk preferences 
across the financial and the environmental domains using the HL MPL method with 
hypothetical rewards.  
 
Methods 
Setting 
The study took place in the outpatient clinics in the Laiko General Hospital in Athens, 
Greece, where one of the authors (CS) had previous research contacts. Laiko is a University 
Hospital, located in the centre of Athens; oneΝ ofΝ theΝ country’sΝ largestΝ generalΝ publicΝ
hospitals, it covers the broader region of Attica. The study was approved by the Research 
Ethics Committee of Laiko Hospital on the 6th of August 2010 (protocol number ES 462). 
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The fieldwork started in September 2010 and was run in four rounds over a period of 
fourteen months.  
 
Although not expected when the study was designed, the period of the fourteen months of 
data collection was of intense economic and political distress for Greece. A series of severe 
austerityΝ measuresΝ wereΝ takenΝ earlierΝ thatΝ yearΝ (χprilΝ βί1ί)Ν whenΝ theΝ country’sΝ deficitΝ
reached 12% of the GDP. In May 2010 the IMF and the EU agreed on the first bailout loan 
to Greece. In June 2011, the Greek parliament voted a new austerity bill, which included 
severe spending cuts and tax increases, while in October 2011 a second ‘bailout’Ν loan was 
agreed. The austerity measures were followed by a series of strikes, violent riots and 
political instability.3  
 
Thus, the economic crisis gradually deteriorated during the months of data collection. For 
instance, the unemployment rate was 13.4% in September 2010 and increased gradually to 
20.2% in October 2011 (51). Although a number of reforms were introduced in healthcare, 
free access to outpatient clinics was not affected during the months of data collection.4 
 
Design 
In the present study we opted for not using IC payment mechanisms for four main reasons. 
First, the idea of implementing IC outcomes related to risky choices in outpatient clinics 
encountered resistance from theΝhospital’sΝEthicsΝωommitteeέΝSo, in order to secure ethical 
approval to the project, tests had to be hypothetical. Second, implementing real payments for 
the chosen lotteries within the financial domain, while making the outcomes within the 
                                                 
3
 For a self-contained timeline of the Greek economic crisis during the period of data collection, also see 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline  
4
 For a more specific discussion of the policy measures in the healthcare area during the economic crisis see 
Petmesidou et al. (52). 
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health domain only hypothetical, clearly implies the introduction of a confounding factor 
that would hinder the attribution of the observed differences in choices to the different 
domains (50). Third, from a methodological perspective, we aimed at road testing the 
extension of the HL MPL method in measuring risk preferences in domains other than 
money, and to contribute to bridging the gap between IC tests for risk preferences with 
money (the HL MPL approach) and hypothetical trade-off methods typically used to 
measure risk preferences in health (the above CE, PE, and GTO approaches). Finally, opting 
for hypothetical payments makes our results closely comparable with the previous findings 
by Wakker and Deneffe (3), Prosser and Wittenberg (4) and Dohmen et al. (29), who also 
looked at risk preferences in money and health by comparing hypothetical responses to 
GTO, CE, or SB-SA tests, respectively. 
 
Sampling 
So that the respondents would perceive the risky tradeoffs as realistic and vivid even in the 
absence of IC consequences for their responses, we approached a pool of subjects who 
found themselves withinΝaΝ ‘naturallyΝoccurring’Ν stateΝofΝbothΝ financialΝandΝhealthΝdistress, 
and presented them tests within a field context and with naturalistic stakes. 
 
Our sample consists of real patients attending outpatient clinics in a hospital in Greece 
during the current economic recession. We assume these subjects are naturally exposed at 
the same time to both finance- and health-related risk. The two sources of field risks are 
different in nature, at least according to the distinction between foreground and background 
risk discussed by Harrison, List, and Towe (49). Given the field setting where subjects were 
recruited, the health risk associated with visiting a hospital clinic can be considered a 
foreground risk, while the financial crisis is a background risk. 
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Furthermore, recruiting our sample in a clinical setting renders it more likely that subjects 
are apprehensive about the state of their health compared to the one of their finances. Thus 
in this sample subjects likely are more risk averse in health than in money, which would not 
hold in other contexts.  
 
We targeted a sample size of n=300 patients. We recruited patients from all outpatient 
clinics where patients were reasonably affected by health conditions characterized by only 
moderate pain or discomfort, anxiety or distress, according to the EQ-5D classification 
(53,54). When recruiting, we approached all patients while they were waiting to see their 
doctors in the outpatient clinics of the hospital, between 9 am and 1 pm. Research assistants 
simply mentioned that the questionnaire was a study conducted by a university. Interviews 
were conducted roughly equally across all working days of the week, and all morning hours. 
We reached the final target of n=300 patients by approaching 386 patients in total, 
corresponding to a response rate of 78 per cent. In order to reach the target sample, four 
different rounds of data collection were needed, in September 2010 (round 1, lasting 5 
weeks, n=91), January 2011 (round 2, lasting 4 weeks, n=34), April 2011 (round 3, lasting 5 
weeks, n=56) and October 2011 (round 4, lasting 4 weeks, n=119). 
 
Questionnaire 
Patients who agreed to participate were given a questionnaire which took approximately 20 
minutes to complete. Patients were given both verbal and written instructions. The research 
assistant sat next to them, clarifying issues regarding the experimental tests and making sure 
that respondents clearly understood the questions.  
 
The first part of the questionnaire assessed socio-demographic variables (e.g., age, sex, 
education, income brackets), individual life style and health habits (e.g., self-assessed health, 
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health behaviors), and psychological traits (e.g., overconfidence). In the second part of the 
experiment we elicited individual risk preferences.  
 
The questionnaire was developed in English and was linguistically validated in Greek 
following the guidelines on cross-cultural adaptation (55,56). It was first tested among 32 
patients from the same population (see Online Appendix B). The responses from this pilot 
were not included in the final analysis.  
 
Framework 
We assume that risk preferences are elicited within the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
framework for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) individual (2,9,45,57): the utility 
function of a subject in the financial domain, in terms of monetary payoffs W, is thus 
w
r
r
WWU
w 1)( 1                                                                       (1) 
 
where wr   is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion in finance. Subjects’ risk 
aversion can be grouped in three main types: 
1. If  0wr ,   risk neutral 
2. If 0wr , >risk averse 
3. If 0wr  , risk seeking 
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In a similar way, the utility of a subject within the health domain is defined in terms of days 
in full health H, and assumed to be 
H
r
r
HHU
H 1)( 1  where Hr   is the coefficient of constant 
relative risk aversion in health.5 
 
Eliciting risk preferences 
We used the same MPL method (3) (2,45–48) to elicit risk preferences in both finance and 
health. Each subject was asked two sets of questions, first in finance (questions Q1.11 in the 
Online Appendix A), then in health (questions Q1.13 in the Online Appendix A). The pilot 
study, in fact, suggested that the lotteries were easier to understand if presented in finance 
first. Presenting the financial lotteries before the health ones makes the test directly 
comparable with the analogous design by Prosser and Wittenberg (4). Such a design feature 
of our study, however, does not allow us to explicitly account for possible order effects of 
responses across different domains (see the Online Appendix B). The questionnaire also 
included inter-temporal questions, which are not analyzed here. 
 
In each set of risk preference questions patients were asked to choose between two risky 
options (lotteries), A and B (Tables 2 and 3). In the 9 pairs of risky options in either set we 
varied both the probabilities pkj and the payoffs associated with each outcome k= 1,2 of the 
two lotteries, either in monetary (Wkj) or in days in full health (Hkj) terms, with j= A,B. The 
probabilities varied from ίΝ toΝ 1ίίΣ,Ν whileΝ theΝ payoffsΝ variedΝ fromΝ €1ίΝ toΝ €γκηΝ inΝ theΝ
financial domain. Subjects could not manifest indifference between the two lotteries. 
                                                 
5
 As an extension, we have also considered risk preferences within the Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) model 
by Quiggin (58). RDU is a generalization of EUT that allows subjects to transform the objective probabilities 
presented in lotteries and to use these weighted probabilities as decision weights in the evaluation of the 
lotteries. In particular, we have consideredΝ theΝ ‘power’Ν probabilityΝ weightingΝ functionΝ w(p)Ν proposedΝ byΝ
Quiggin (58) which is defined over a uniqueΝ ‘curvature’Ν parameterΝ yμΝw(p)οpy. When y≠1 the RDU model 
deviatesΝfromΝtheΝEUTΝmodelμΝconcavityΝandΝconvexityΝofΝw(p)ΝareΝsaidΝtoΝreflectΝ‘optimism’ΝandΝ‘pessimism’, 
respectively, in how a subject perceives objective probabilities. The Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) 
from a two-prizes lottery in health, for instance, can be written as RDEU=[w(p(H1))*U(H1)]+[(1-
w(p(H1)))*U(H1)], where w(p)=py. In footnote 14 we briefly report the results obtained under RDU.    
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
To elicit risk preferences in health, we framed the financial paired-lottery method in terms of 
health rewards, while keeping unaltered the structure and all other features of the MPL 
elicitation test in order to allow for comparability across domains. Therefore, the lotteries 
were presented as pairs of different healthcare treatments characterized by some risk. The 
healthcare context was chosen to ensure a vivid and realistic representation of the 
hypothetical alternatives by patients attending outpatient clinics, and is fully in line with the 
choice between two surgical procedures by Wakker and Deneffe (3) and two drugs by 
Prosser and Wittenberg (4). Participants were told that each treatment in the pair of options 
was expected to provide some amount of health benefits with some probability, and a lower 
amount of health benefits with the complementary probability. Analogously to the financial 
domain, one treatment (A) was presented as characterized by a smaller difference between 
health benefits than the risky treatment (lottery B), and the series of pairs of treatments only 
differ with respect to the probabilities of occurrence for the higher health benefits. 
Concerning the exact nature of health benefits, the natural candidate for the equivalent of an 
extra unit of money in the health domain was an extra unit of time in full health.6  
 
Importantly, by considering patients in hospital clinics, who were by definition not yet 
‘satiated’ in their level of time in full health, we ensured that a lottery in health providing an 
extra unit of time in full health was perceived as associated with a strictly positive benefit by 
all subjects. To emphasize this, we also made it clear that, once the effects of the health 
                                                 
6
 This is consistent with the conceptual framework of cost-utility analysis (CUA) where health benefits are 
typically evaluated relative to the benchmark of a unit of time in full health, whose benefit in terms of utility is 
usually standardized to one. In the monetary domain, this closely corresponds to standardizing to one the utility 
of a unit of income/money. The choice of time in full health as the natural equivalent metric of money in the 
health domain is also in line with Wakker and Deneffe (3) and Prosser and Wittenberg (4). 
15 
 
treatments would end, subjects would go back to the health status they were initially 
experiencing. This is analogous to the stimuli used by Prosser and Wittenberg (4).  
 
Comparing the finance and health domains 
The implicit conversion rate between domains was of one euro per day in full health. The 
choice of the conversion rate was based on the evidence from the pilot experiment run with 
a sample of patients from the same hospital having similar characteristics to the respondents 
in our experiment. The assumption of the one-to-one conversion rate is key for the analysis 
(under both the EUT and the RDU models) as it impacts the cross-domain comparisons: a 
detailed discussion of the justification, methodological issues, and limitations associated 
with our conversion rate between domains can be found in Online Appendix B. 
 
Estimating risk preferences 
To estimate risk preferences we used Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods and followed the 
econometric approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (45,47,48) and Harrison 
and Rutström (46), where the full details of the empirical strategy can be found.7 A self-
contained discussion of the approach can be found in Online Appendix C. We pooled all the 
observations and included a categorical variable (‘H’) to control for whether the responses 
refer to the money (H= 0) or the health domain (H= 1).8 As we collected 9 responses for each 
domain from 300 subjects, the resulting dataset comprised 5400 observations overall. We 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of observations within the same subject, 
by treating the residuals from the same individual as potentially correlated, and computing 
cluster-robust standard errors. InΝ theΝmodel,Ν theΝ ‘r’ΝparameterΝ isΝ aΝ functionΝofΝ theΝdomainΝ
(‘H’),Ν ofΝ theΝ roundsΝ ofΝ dataΝ collection,Ν and of other observable individual characteristics. 
                                                 
7
 An alternative approach has recently been proposed by Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau, and Rutström (59). 
8
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 
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ψesidesΝ theΝ estimatedΝ ωRRχΝ coefficientΝ ‘r’,Ν theΝ εδΝ estimationsΝ reportΝ aΝ ‘noise’Ν (‘mu’)Ν
parameterΝ whichΝ reflectsΝ theΝ individualΝ ‘errors’Ν inΝ identifyingΝ the preferred lottery (as 
mentioned, indifference was excluded by design).  
 
Variables and descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents the definition and main descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
analysis. We use socio-demographic variables toΝcontrolΝforΝrespondents’Νage (age), gender 
(female), marital status (married), levels of education (educ), self-assessed health (sah), and 
for whether or not they have children (children). We use two economic variables: one 
showing the monthly income bracket the respondent belongs to (income), and another 
indicating how constrained respondents feel by their current financial situation (finconstr).9 
As we pool all subjects, the variables round2, round3, and round4 control for the round 
when the questionnaire was collected, with the reference being round 1: 91 patients were 
interviewed in round 1 of data collection, 34 patients in round 2, 56 in round 3, and, finally, 
119 in round 4.  The categorical variable H represents the domain in which the responses to 
questions on risk preferences are elicited. The main question is whether the domain variable 
H is statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Results 
 
We first present the coefficient of risk aversion structurally estimated using all the data 
pooled across both domains (Model 1, Table 5). The estimated CRRA coefficient is 
                                                 
9
 The correlation between income and finconstr is negative and highly significant (p=0.000) for the whole 
sample (-0.2026) as well as for each round of data collection (-0.2234, -0.3488, -0.3574, and -0.2905 in rounds 
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). 
17 
 
r=0.0643 (95% Confidence Interval, CI: -0.0273 to 0.1560), not significantly different from 
risk neutrality. The fact that subjects exhibit overall risk neutral preferences is broadly 
consistent with the view that the use of hypothetical elicitation methods can favour the 
observation of risk neutral over risk averse responses (2,37–40,60).  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
When looking at the differences across domains, we find that our sample exhibits significant 
risk averse responses in the health domain: while the overall estimated coefficient of risk 
aversion is not statistically different from zero (p=0.169), the estimated coefficient for the 
health domain variable is 0.133 (95% CI: 0.0212 to 0.2455) and statistically significantly 
different from zero (p=0.020), corresponding to a moderate degree of risk aversion (Model 
2, Table 5).10 
 
When we pool all data across both domains and control for the rounds of data collection 
(n=91 in round 1; n=34 in round 2; n=56 in round 3; n=119 in round 4), we find evidence of 
progressively more risk seeking responses in Models 3-5, (Table 5) but not in Model 7, 
which also controls for finconstr (see below): responses are significantly more  risk seeking 
in rounds 2, 3, and 4 compared to the first round of data collection. Risk preferences in the 
health domain remain statistically significantly more risk averse than in the finance domain 
                                                 
10
 χsΝmentionedΝinΝfootnoteΝη,ΝweΝhaveΝalsoΝestimatedΝsubjects’ΝriskΝpreferencesΝunderΝtheΝRϊUΝmodelΝusingΝ
theΝ ‘power’Ν probabilityΝ weightingΝ functionΝ proposedΝ byΝ Quiggin (58). The RDU estimations qualify the 
findingsΝobtainedΝ forΝ theΝEUTΝandΝallowΝusΝ toΝ ‘structurallyΝdecompose’Ν theΝpartΝofΝ theΝ riskΝpremiumΝdueΝ toΝ
aversionΝ toΝ outcomeΝ variabilityΝ (theΝ ‘r’Ν parameter)Ν andΝ theΝ partΝ dueΝ toΝ probabilityΝ weightingΝ (theΝ ‘y’Ν
coefficient) (12).  όirst,Ν theΝestimatesΝofΝtheΝ‘y’ΝcoefficientΝ(yο1έθγγκ,ΝwithΝrobustΝstandard errors of 0.1249, 
p=0.000) suggest that for subjects in our sample, the RDU model seems to be favored in comparison to EUT 
(under which y should not be significantly different from 1). Second, under RDU subjects appear generally 
characterized by a more concave curvature of the utility function than under EUT (r=0.3695, with standard 
errors of 0.0868, p=0.000). Third, and in line with the risk preferences patterns described above for EUT, the 
estimatesΝofΝtheΝhealthΝdomainΝeffectΝonΝtheΝ‘r’Νcoefficient indicate that patients in our sample are characterized 
by significantly more concave utility functions in health than in finance (H=0.1983, with standard errors of 
ίέίλ1β,Ν pοίέίγί)έΝ όinally,Ν theΝ estimatesΝ ofΝ theΝ healthΝ domainΝ effectΝ onΝ theΝ ‘y’Ν coefficientΝ ofΝ theΝ ‘power’Ν
function show that the probability weighting function is not statistically different across the two domains 
(0.1637, with standard errors of 0.1417, p=0.248). 
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(Models 4-5, Table 5). As shown by the lack of statistical significance of the interaction 
terms (except for a significant effect of round 3, n=56), the cross-domain difference in risk 
preferences does not vary according to the degree of exogenous financial risk, while the 
effects of the rounds of data collection are still significant (Model 5, Table 5).11 
 
Controlling for a range of socio-demographic variables shows no statistically significant 
association of the overall estimated risk aversion with observable characteristics except for 
the variable finconstr that is statistically significantly associated with more risk seeking 
responses (Model 6, Table 5).12. The introduction of interaction terms between the rounds 
and the financial constraint status shows that the subjects who, in round 4, felt more 
uncomfortable with their financial situations reported more risk-seeking responses (Model 7, 
Table 5).13 
 
Discussion 
The result that respondents in our pool were relatively more risk averse in health than 
financial matters is in line with Wakker and Deneffe (3), who found more risk aversion in 
                                                 
11
 The same pattern of risk preferences at different rounds of data collection emerges when looking at the raw 
responsesΝofΝsubjectsΝinΝtermsΝofΝ‘switchingΝpoints’ΝbetweenΝlotteryΝχΝtoΝlotteryΝψΝinΝtheΝtwoΝsetsΝofΝquestionsέΝ
In the MPL tests, in fact, the later the respondents switch to lottery B, the more risk averse they are. Notice 
that, in contrast with what is often documented in lab experiments, in our sample virtually no subject switched 
more than once across lotteries in each block of questions. This was mainly due to the fact that, in our 
experiment, research assistants sat next to the patients, and were trained to provide clear instructions and 
guidance to respondents. The raw responses of subjects interviewed in later rounds of data collection exhibited 
less risk aversion in both the finance and the health domains. In finance, the average switching point was 
5.7011, 5.1176, 4.6786, and 4.3675 in rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In health, the average switching point 
was 6.4934, 4.9687, 4.5647, and 4.2454 in rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The correlation between the 
switching points across domains is positive and significant (p=0.000) for the whole sample (0.5136) as well as 
for each round of data collection (0.2905, 0.2287, 0.6529, and 0.7562 in rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively). 
Moreover, subjects self-reported higher degree of financial distress in later rounds of data collection: the 
average value of finconstr was 2.1428 in round 1, 2.3333 in round 2, 2.4347 in round 3, and 2.8271 in round 4. 
12
 We have also estimated many alternative models and found, for instance, that in our sample the estimated 
EUT CRRA coefficient of risk aversion is not statistically significantly associated to a range of health 
behaviors such as smoking (p=0.182), drinking (p=0.159), physical exercise (p=0.983), having chronic 
conditions (0.149),Ν andΝ ofΝ psychologicalΝ attitudesΝ suchΝ asΝ ‘illusionΝ ofΝ control’Ν (pοίέβκη)Ν orΝ ‘better-than-
average’ΝoverconfidenceΝ(pοίέζβθ)έ 
13
 When interpreting these results, it is worthwhile to recall that the finconstr variable captures self-reported 
feelings of being constrained by the financial situation.  
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health in their between-subjects study. Our findings are also qualitatively in line with those 
of Blais and Weber (24) using the DOSPERT test, and with the Dohmen et al. (29) finding 
that SOEP respondents reported higher willingness to take risk in finance than in health.  
 
Our findings are the opposite of what found by Prosser and Wittenberg (4): patients in their 
sample were risk neutral in health, while significantly risk averse in finance. Besides 
obvious differences in the subject pools, as well as in the methods used to measure risk 
preferences, the different patterns in cross-domain risk attitudes could be due to the fact that 
our respondents were simultaneously exposed to both financial and health distress. 
 
Both raw responses and estimated risk aversion parameters show that respondents were 
more likely to seek risk if they were interviewed at later rounds of the study, when the 
recession worsened. This is generally in line with observations of the spread of risky 
behaviors among the Greeks during the economic recession (61,62).  
 
Our findings are the opposite of what is documented as counter-cyclical risk aversion (i.e., 
people taking more risks when the economy is growing): Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, and 
Marechal (63) found that Swiss financial professionals primed to a fictive chart of a 
booming stock market took higher risk in an incentive-compatible assessment of risk 
preferences than subjects primed to a busting market. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (64) 
found similar results in hypothetical risk preference questions to customers of an Italian 
bank before and after the 2008 crisis.  
 
 
Conclusions 
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Our goal was to elicit risk preferences in the financial and health domains using the same 
MPL paired-lottery method. We considered a sample of Greek patients in the middle of an 
economic recession and we found evidence that risk preferences may differ between the 
health and the financial domains even when they are measured using the same MPL method. 
When exposed to both financial and health distress, our sample of Greek patients tends to be 
more risk averse in health than in finance. 
 
From a methodological perspective, conducting the same MPL test with subjects in 
naturally occurring field situations of both financial and health distress can contribute to 
bring closer together two streams of methods which have proceeded along distinct paths: on 
the one hand, incentive-compatible (IC) experimental measures for risk preferences with real 
monetary stakes, and on the other, hypothetical tests in the health domain. Despite its key 
importance for both research and policy purposes, there is still noΝcurrentΝ‘goldΝstandard’ΝtoΝ
measure risk preferences in health, nor to compare them across different domains 
(4,26,27,65). Our review section is an attempt to bring closer together the different 
approaches and methods in this area. 
 
The study has several limitations. In Online Appendix B, we extensively discuss some of the 
limitations of our design which include: sample selection due to recruiting patients in out-
patient clinics; key assumptions on the EUT, the CRRA, the specific levels of the stakes, 
and the implicit conversion rate between one euro and one day in full health; possible order 
effects of asking subjects risk preferences questions in finance first; and unknown 
interactions between the foreground and background risks as perceived by the subjects. 
 
Furthermore, due to the constraints related to approaching patients in hospital clinics, we 
asked respondents to make hypothetical choices. There is evidence that responses to 
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hypothetical questions exhibit less risk aversion compared to IC methods (2,37–40,60,66–
68). A different experimental design (e.g. Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutström (66)) would 
permit assessment of the extent of the above hypothetical bias, and recalibration of 
responses for this. More generally, the design and implementation of IC measures of risk 
preferences in the health domain is a challenging but promising area, and we envisage 
further research in more controlled experimental settings. An interesting question is related 
to whether the ‘disciplinary power’ of IC tests is sufficiently strong to align responses on 
risk preferences across the two domains. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations our findings have significant implications. Our results 
imply caution in using measures for risk aversion elicited in financial contexts to infer risk 
preferences in health domains. More studies on the validity of existing methodologies in 
assessing risk preferences across domains should be welcome. Another research area that 
warrants further investigation is whether within-subject risk preferences are stable across 
different health-related contexts, such as preventive care or medical treatments, for instance. 
 
The implications of our findings are not only of academic interest. The development of 
different metrics to measure risk preferences in health and to compare them with their 
monetary analogues can prove useful to enrich the validity of the cost-effectiveness analyses 
and decision-making models in which they are incorporated (69). More generally, accessing 
evidence on how risks are traded off across wealth and health helps in assessing the 
likelihood that people enroll in voluntary health insurance schemes, and in estimating the 
willingness to pay for them. This is a key concern as private insurance schemes will become 
increasingly important to increase the benefits of publicly-funded universal healthcare 
coverage. Our results also provide useful insights for the design of policy interventions that 
affect decisions and behaviors spanning simultaneously across the financial and health 
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domain, such as the design of financial incentive schemes to tackle health risky behaviors 
(70–73). 
 
Finally, a deeper understanding of risk preferences in health allows a better exploration of 
how patients make healthcare decisions, such as adhering to medical decisions and seeking a 
second medical opinion (74,75). In such decisions a key role is typically played by the 
doctors whose risk preferences may be similar to, or different from, theΝ patients’, in a 
similar way to what previously documented in other contexts (76). The exploration of this 
distinct question is left for further work (77). 
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Table 1: Summary of key studies directly testing risk preferences across different domains. 
Study Design Rewards Method Domains (in 
order, if 
within-
subjects 
design) 
Sample and Setting Same Risk Preferences Across 
Domains? 
Wakker & Deneffe 
(1996) 
Betwee
n-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal 
GTO; CE; 
PE 
Health 
(Operations, 
Life Years); 
Money 
Health: 15 PhD students in 
economics at University of 
Copenhagen; 15 undergraduate 
students in psychology at 
University of Leiden; 24 medical 
students at   University of Leiden. 
Money: 14 researchers in finance 
at University of Mannheim; 28 
undergraduate students at 
University of Limburg in 
Maastricht. 
No. All three methods point to 
significantly more risk aversion in 
the health domain. Curvature of 
probability weighting function is 
more pronounced in health than 
monetary domain: more 
‘probabilisticΝriskΝaversion’ΝinΝhealthΝ
domain. 
Blais & Weber 
(2006) 
Within-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal 
DS 
(DOSPER
T) 
Ethics; 
Finance; 
Health/Safety
; Social life; 
Recreation 
172 English-speaking and 187 
French-speaking respondents 
from general public in Canada. 
No. Significantly more risk aversion 
in the health/safety domain. 87% of 
the total variation in risk taking 
occurs at the domain level. 
Harrison et al. 
(2007) 
Betwee
n-
subject
s 
Real MPL (HL) Money; 
Graded 
Coins; 
Ungraded 
Coins 
113 numismatists attending a coin 
show in Orlando. 
Yes, for money and graded coins: no 
significant differences in risk 
aversion across these two domains. 
No, for ungraded coins: significantly 
more risk aversion for ungraded 
coins than for money or graded 
coins. 
29 
 
Prosser & 
Wittenberg (2007) 
Within-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal 
CE Money; 
Health 
(Drugs, 
Relapse-free 
Days) 
56 adult patients with multiple 
sclerosis attending outpatient 
clinics at two hospitals in Boston; 
57 adult members of general 
public in San Diego. 
No. Risk neutrality in the health 
domain; significantly more risk 
aversion in the monetary domain. 
Barseghyan et al. 
(2011) 
Within-
subject
s 
Real INS Car 
insurance; 
home 
insurance 
1,298 households, US. No. Reject the null hypothesis that 
risk preferences are completely 
general across different domains. 
Only 23% of the sample exhibits 
insurance choices that overlap in 
their implied risk aversion intervals. 
Households are more risk averse in 
their home insurance than in their 
car insurance choices. 
Dohmen et al. 
(2011) 
Within-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal 
SB-SA General; 
Career 
Choice; 
Leisure and 
Recreation; 
Driving; 
Health; 
Financial 
Decisions 
400 subjects of a representative 
sample of Germany. 
Somewhat: about 60% of the 
variation in the risk measures across 
domains can be explained by one 
principal component, while the 
remaining 40% of the variation is 
due to differences in risk preferences 
across domains. 
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Einav et al. (2012) Within-
subject
s 
Real INS Asset 
allocations of 
401(k) 
contributions; 
insurance for: 
short-term 
disability; 
long-term 
disability; 
healthcare 
expenditure; 
drug 
expenditure; 
dental 
expenditure 
12,752 Alcoa employees, US. Somewhat: reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no domain-general 
component of risk preferences, but 
substantial domain specificity of risk 
preferences. When estimations 
account for domain-specific 
parameters only 5.3% of the sample 
exhibits insurance choices that 
overlap in their implied risk aversion 
intervals. 
Riddel (2012) Within-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal 
MPL (HL) Money; 
Environment 
(Clean Up of 
Oil Spills, 
Square Miles 
Cleaned)  
40 members of Porsche Club of 
America, Las Vegas; 85 climbers, 
Red Rock Canyon, near Las 
Vegas; 77 undergraduate and 
graduate students at University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. 
No. Curvature of the probability 
weighting function is more 
pronounced in environmental than 
financial domain: more 
‘probabilisticΝriskΝaversion’ΝinΝtheΝ
environmental domain. 
Warshawsky-
Livne et al.  
(2012) 
Within-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal 
CE Health 
(Treatments, 
Life Years); 
Money 
593 students at Ben-Gurion 
University, Israel. 
Somewhat: some differences across 
domains, but risk preferences are 
broadly consistent across the health 
and the financial domains.  
Wolbert & Riedl 
(2013) 
Within-
subject
s 
Hypotheti
cal; real 
SB-SA; 
MPL (HL) 
Money; 
Leisure and 
Recreation; 
Driving; 
Health 
144 students of Maastricht 
Business School. 
No. Risk preferences elicited with 
IC MPL HL task are uncorrelated 
with SB-SA risk preferences in 
health, leisure and recreation, and 
driving. 
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Ioannou & Sadeh 
(2014) 
Within-
subject
s 
(counte
r-
balance
d 
order) 
Real MPL 
(Binswang
er) 
Money; 
Environment 
(Bee-
Friendly 
Plants) 
81 students of the University of 
Southampton 
No. Significantly more risk aversion 
in the environmental than in the 
monetary domain. 
Note. INS: Insurance method; SB-SA: Scale-Based Self-Assessed method; DS: Domain Specific questionnaire method; DOSPERT: DOSPERT questionnaire method; CE: Certain 
Equivalent method; PE: Probability Equivalent method; GTO: Gamble Trade-Off method; MPL: Multiple Price List method; HL: Holt & Laury method. 
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Table 2: Payoff matrix in the HL MPL experimental test in the financial domain 
P
ai
r 
Lottery A Lottery B EVA EVB EVA-EVB CRRA range if 
subject 
switches from 
lottery A to 
lottery B at 
that pair 
 P1 €1 P2 €2 P1 €1 P2 €2 € € €  
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 164 47.5 116.55 -∞νΝ-1.71 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 168 85.0 83.0 -1.71; -0.95 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 172 122.5 49.5 -0.95; -0.49 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 176 160.0 16.0 -0.49; -0.15 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 180 197.5 -17.5 -0.15; 0.14 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 184 235.0 -51.0 0.14; 0.41 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 188 272.5 -84.5 0.41; 0.68 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 192 310.0 -118.0 0.68; 0.97 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 196 347.5 -151.5 0.97; 1.37 
Notes.  
HL: Holt & Laury method; MPL: Multiple Price List method; EV: Expected Value; CRRA: Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion. 
The columns with the expected values for the lotteries and the implied CRRA ranges were not shown to the 
subjects in the field experiment. The implied CRRA ranges presume that, for every gamble before the 
switching pair, lottery A is preferred, and, for every gamble after the switching pair, lottery B is preferred. 
The specific instructions for this item are reported in Question Q.1.11 in Online Appendix A. 
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Table 3: The set of choices between binary lotteries given to the patients in the health 
domain. 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your Choice 
 P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
Note.  
The specific instructions for this item are reported in Question Q.1.13 in Online Appendix A. 
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Table 4: Description of variables 
 
        
Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Age Age in years 39.62 12.91 18 74 
Female Female (0=no, 1=yes) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Educ Level of education 5.59 1.63 1 8 
Income 
Income level (1= less thanΝ€θίίΝ…ηοmoreΝthanΝ
€β,ίίί) 2.58 1.06 1 5 
Finconstr 
Feeling constrained by financial state (1=living 
comfortably…ζοfindΝitΝveryΝdifficult) 2.46 0.75 1 4 
Married Married (0=no, 1=yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Children Having children (0=no, 1=yes) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
SAH Self-assessedΝhealthΝ(1οΝveryΝgood…ηοveryΝbad) 2.40 1.16 1 5 
Round2, 
Round3, 
Round4 Variables for rounds 2, 3, and 4 of data collection     0 1 
H Variable for responses in health domain   0 1 
Extra variables used in robustness estimations (results briefly reported in note 16) 
(Chronic) Chronic condition (0=no, 1=yes) 0.17 0.38 0 1 
(Smoker) Smoking daily or occassionally (0=no, 1=yes) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
(Alcohol) More than one alcohol unit per week (0=no, 1=yes) 0.65 0.48 0 1 
(Exercise) Number of hours of vigorous exercise per week  2.76 4.38 0 50 
(BTA) Better than average index 59.44 33.43 -72 100 
(IoC) Illusion of control index 61.29 12.80 18.75 100 
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Table 5: Structural estimates of CRRA parameters 
 
   
 R model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 
H  0.1333**  0.1461** 0.284**   
  (0.0572)  (0.0621) (0.117)   
Round2   -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.268**  -0.6308* 
   (0.106) (0.106) (0.132)  (0.3638) 
Round3   -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.425***  -0.0252 
   (0.131) (0.132) (0.158)  (0.3856) 
Round4   -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.499***  0.1895 
   (0.115) (0.115) (0.143)  (0.3542) 
H*R2     -0.227   
     (0.188)   
H*R3     -0.294**   
      (0.149)   
H*R4     -0.203   
     (0.151)   
Age        0.0033  
        (0.0055)  
Female        -0.0416  
        (0.0990)  
Educ        -0.0337  
        (0.0362)  
Married        0.1689  
        (0.1365)  
Children        -0.1461  
        (0.1522)  
SAH        -0.0140  
        (0.0599)  
Income        -0.0846  
        (0.0514)  
Finconstr       -0.163** 0.1193 
       (0.0684) (0.0919) 
FinC*R2          0.1372 
     
  (0.1511) 
FinC*R3       -0.2583 
     
  (0.1609) 
FinC*R4       -0.2896** 
     
  (0.1419) 
Constant 0.0643 -0.0029 0.433*** 0.361*** 0.293*** 0.776** 0.138 
 (0.0467) (0.0570) (0.0808) (0.0867) (0.101) (0.366) (0.217) 
Noise ( )               
 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.263*** 0.255*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Obs. 5400 5400 5400 5400 5400 4122 4176 
Notes. 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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H: health domain responses. 
SAH: self-assessed health. 
Finconstr: self-reported feeling of being constrained by financial situation. 
H*R2, H*R3, H*R4: interaction terms between H and rounds 2, 3, and 4 respectively. 
FinC*R2, FinC*R3, FinC*R4: interaction terms between Finconstr and rounds 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  
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Online Appendix A – Questionnaires both in English and Greek 
Dear Madam/Sir 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a study asking your personal views on 
health and life in general. The survey consists of two parts. The first part takes place 
while waiting to see your doctor and takes 15 minutes to complete. The second part will 
be completed after you see your doctor and takes 5 minutes to answer. 
 
The study is conducted strictly for academic purposes and neither the Hospital nor the 
doctor have any involvement in it. All answers will remain completely anonymous and 
confidential.  
 
We appreciate your time and effort. 
 
Kind regards, 
The Research Team  
 
 
Q1.01 ώowΝisΝyourΝhealthΝinΝgeneralςΝWouldΝyouΝsayΝitΝis… (please circle the appropriate 
box) 
 
Very 
Good 
Good Fair Bad Very bad (NA) 
 
 
Q1.02 Are you hampered in your daily activities in any way by any longstanding illness, or 
disability, infirmity or mental health problem? If yes, is that a lot or to some extent? (please 
circle the appropriate box) 
 
Yes, a lot Yes, to some 
extent 
No (NA) 
 
Q1.03 Do you smoke or did you ever smoke? (please circle the appropriate box) 
 
Smoke 
daily 
Smoke 
occasionally  
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
daily 
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
occasionally 
Never 
smoked 
(NA) 
 
 
Q1.04 If you smoke, how many cigarettes do you smoke on average a day?  
 (please indicate number of cigarettes in the box) 
 
 
Q1.05 How many units of alcohol do you drink a week? (a unit of alcohol corresponds to a 
small glass of wine, a medium glass of beer or a shot of 
spirits). 
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Q1.06 How many hours a week do you usually spend in moderate physical activities? 
Consider as a physical activity any moderate physical activity lasting for at least 40 
consecutive minutes (such as walking, cleaning, gardening). 
 
Q1.07 How many hours a week do you usually spend in vigorous physical activities? 
Consider as a physical activity any vigorous physical activity lasting for at least 40 
consecutive minutes (such as cycling, jogging, gym, step aerobics, swimming, 
football etc). 
 
 
Q1.08 Please indicate whether each of the following statements applies or not to your 
behaviour: (please tick the appropriate column) 
 Totally 
agree Agree 
It 
depends 
Do not 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
a. I never make up a decision I will 
regret in the future      
b. I can never identify which 
choice is better for me      
c. Life is like a lottery. Being 
happy is just a matter of chance      
d. My forecasts are always correct 
     
 
 
Q1.09 Provide a percentage to answer each of the following questions: 
 Percentage 
(%) 
a. What percentage of people of your age have a better job than you,  
because they have better skills than you 
 
b. What percentage of your neighbours will better succeed in life when 
compared to you because of their better qualities with respect to yours 
 
c. What percentage of people of your age will have higher cash 
payments than yours for their better performance in their jobs?  
 
 
 
Q1.10 How I see myself (tick the appropriate column): 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Not 
sure 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
a. I am a daring person who generally 
takes risks.      
b. I take initiative, pursuing opportunities 
even when they involve some risk.      
c. I am a cautious person who generally 
avoids risks.      
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d. I always play it safe even if it means 
occasionally losing out on a good 
opportunity. 
     
 
 
 
Q1.11. Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative 
hypothetical lotteries, choose the lottery that you prefer between option A and option B. 
Lottery A will give you either 200 € or 160 € with some probabilities which change 
gradually in each row. Lottery B will give you either 385 € or 10 € again with some 
probabilities that change gradually in each row.  
 
όorΝ instance,Ν inΝ rowΝ 1,Ν lotteryΝ χΝ givesΝ youΝ βίίΝ €ΝwithΝ probabilityΝ 1ίΣΝ andΝ 1θίΝ €ΝwithΝ
probabilityΝ λίΣ,Ν whileΝ lotteryΝ ψΝ givesΝ youΝ γκηΝ €Ν withΝ probabilityΝ 1ίΣΝ andΝ 1ίΝ €Ν withΝ
probability 90%. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around 
either A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’sΝyourΝ
personal choices we are interested in.  
 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € p € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
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Q1.12 Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative 
hypothetical options, choose the one that you prefer between option A and option B. Both 
options give you certain monetary payments. Payments in option A will be given at a later 
date, and payments in option B are given today. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, 
by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or 
wrong answers. It’sΝyourΝpersonalΝchoicesΝweΝareΝinterestedΝinέ 
 
 
ID Option A                  Option B Your choice 
1 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 60 € today A B 
2 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 120 € today A B 
3 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 180 € today A B 
4 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 240 € today A B 
5 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
     
6 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 60 € today A B 
7 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 120 € today A B 
8 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 180 € today A B 
9 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 240 € today A B 
10 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
     
11 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 60 € today A B 
12 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 120 € today A B 
13 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 180 € today A B 
14 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 240 € today A B 
15 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
     
16 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 150 € today A B 
17 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
18 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 450 € today A B 
19 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 600 € today A B 
20 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 750 € today A B 
     
21 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 150 € today A B 
22 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
23 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 450 € today A B 
24 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 600 € today A B 
25 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 750 € today A B 
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26 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 150 € today A B 
27 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
28 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 450 € today A B 
29 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 600 € today A B 
30 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 750 € today A B 
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Q1.13. Please think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you need to choose 
between two medical treatments, A and B. Each treatment has two possible outcomes in 
terms of how long the effect will last. You know the probabilities with which this will 
happen. Irrespective of which treatment you choose, for as long as their effect lasts you are 
in full health. When the effect of the treatment is gone, you go back to your initial state 
of health, i.e. the state you where before you started the treatment that is the same 
regardless of the treatment you chose, and no further treatment will be allowed. 
 
For instance, in row 1, treatment A will give you 200 days of full health with probability 
10% or 160 days in full health with probability 90%. Treatment B gives you 385 days of full 
health with probability 10% or 10 days in full health with probability 90%.  
 
Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the 
last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’sΝyourΝpersonalΝchoicesΝweΝ
are interested in. 
 
 Treatment A Treatment B Your 
Choice 
 P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in 
full health 
  
1 10% 200 days 90% 160 days  10% 385 days  90% 10 days A B 
2 20% 200 days  80% 160 days  20% 385 days  80% 10 days A B 
3 30% 200 days  70% 160 days  30% 385 days  70% 10 days A B 
4 40% 200 days  60% 160 days  40% 385 days  60% 10 days A B 
5 50% 200 days  50% 160 days  50% 385 days  50% 10 days A B 
6 60% 200 days  40% 160 days  60% 385 days  40% 10 days A B 
7 70% 200 days  30% 160 days  70% 385 days  30% 10 days A B 
8 80% 200 days  20% 160 days  80% 385 days  20% 10 days A B 
9 90% 200 days  10% 160 days  90% 385 days  10% 10 days A B 
 
 
43 
 
Q1.14 Think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you currently suffer from a 
specific medical condition that has an impact on your health. You can choose between two 
medical treatments, A and B. Treatment A is available at a later date whilst treatment B is 
available today. When you start the treatment regardless of the starting date, its effects will 
last for the days stated in each option. For example, in the first choice, treatment A will give 
you full health for γθίΝdaysΝstartingΝinΝoneΝweek’sΝtime,ΝandΝtreatmentΝψΝwillΝgiveΝyouΝθίΝ
days of full health starting from today. At the end of the treatment you go back to your 
initial state, i.e. the state you were before you started the treatment, and no further 
treatment will be allowed. 
 
There are no other differences between the two treatments. Please, for each of the following 
rows, choose the option that you prefer between treatment A and treatment B. Please, make 
your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. 
Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’sΝyourΝpersonalΝchoicesΝweΝareΝinterestedΝ
in. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your 
choice 
1  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
2  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
3  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
180 days in full health  starting today A B 
4  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
5  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
6  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
7  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
8  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
9  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 month 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
10  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
11  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
12  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
13  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
14  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
15  360 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
16  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
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17  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
18  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
19  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
20  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
21  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
22  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
23  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
450 days in full starting health today A B 
24  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
25  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
26  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
27  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
28  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
29  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
30  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
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For statistical purposes we would like to ask you the following... 
 
Q1.15 What is your date of birth? 
 
 
Q1.16 What is you sex? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Male Female 
 
Q1.17 What is the highest level of education you have completed?   (please circle) 
a. Never been to school 
b. Primary School 
c. Junior High School 
d. High School 
e. Technical School 
f. Technical College 
g. University 
h. Post-Graduate studies 
i. (DA) 
 
Q1.18 What is your marital status? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Single Married Divorced Widow (NA) 
 
Q1.19 Do you have children? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Yes No (NA) 
 
Q1.20 Are you currently living alone? (please circle as appropriate) 
Yes No (NA) 
 
 
Q1.21 Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’sΝincomeΝnowadaysςΝ 
Living comfortably on present income  
  Coping on present income  
Find it difficult on present income  
Finding it very difficult on present income  
(NA)  
 
Q1.22 Thinking of your monthly personal income, is this: 
 
Less than 600 
Euros 
601- 1000 
Euros 
1001-1500 
Euros 
1501-2000 
Euros 
2000-3000 Euros More than 3000 
 
Day Month Year 
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ǹιδσĲδηβήİΝΚυλέα/Kτλδİ 
 
ΘαΝ γΫζαηİ θαΝ ıαμΝ πλκıεαζΫıκυηİΝ θαΝ ζΪίİĲİΝ ηΫλκμΝ ıİΝ ηδαΝ Ϋλİυθα πκυΝ ηİζİĲΪΝ ĲδμΝ
πλκıππδεΫμΝ απσοİδμ ıαμΝ ıξİĲδεΪΝ ηİΝ ĲβθΝ υΰİέαΝ εαδΝ ĲκθΝ Ĳλσπκ απάΝıαμΝ ΰİθδεσĲİλαέΝǾΝ
ΫλİυθαΝαπκĲİζİέĲαδΝαπσΝįτκΝηΫλβέΝΣκΝπλυĲκΝηΫλκμΝπλαΰηαĲκπκδİέĲαδΝİθυΝπİλδηΫθİĲİΝθαΝ
įİέĲİΝĲκΝΰδαĲλσΝıαμΝεαδΝįδαλεİέΝ1η ζİπĲΪέΝΣκΝįİτĲİλκΝηΫλκμΝγαΝκζκεζβλπγİέΝαφκτΝįİέĲİΝ
ĲκΝΰδαĲλσΝıαμΝεαδΝįδαλεİέΝη ζİπĲΪέ 
 
ǾΝΫλİυθαΝπλαΰηαĲκπκδİέĲαδΝαυıĲβλΪΝΰδαΝαεαįβηαρεκτμΝζσΰκυμΝεαδΝĲσıκΝĲκΝθκıκεκηİέκΝ
σıκΝεαδΝκΝΰδαĲλσμΝıαμΝįİθΝΫξİδΝκπκδαįάπκĲİΝıυηηİĲκξάΝıİΝαυĲά. ΌζİμΝκδΝαπαθĲάıİδμΝγαΝ
παλαηİέθκυθΝαποζτĲωμ αθυθυηİμ εαδ İηπδıĲİυĲδεΫμέ  
 
΢αμΝİυξαλδıĲκτηİΝΰδαΝĲκΝξλσθκΝıαμέ 
 
ΜİΝφδζδεκτμΝξαδλİĲδıηκτμ, 
ǾΝǼλİυθβĲδεάΝΟηΪįαΝ 
 
ΕΡέ 1έί1 ΠυμΝİέθαδΝβΝυΰİέαΝıαμΝΰİθδεΪνΝΘαΝζΫΰαĲİΝσĲδΝİέθαδ… (παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİΝ
αθΪζκΰα) 
 
ΠκζτΝ
εαζά 
Καζά ΙεαθκπκδβĲδεά Άıξβηβ ΠκζτΝ
Άıξβηβ 
(ǻǹ) 
 
 
ΕΡέ 1έίβ ΢ĲδμΝεαγβηİλδθΫμΝıαμΝįλαıĲβλδσĲβĲİμΝıυθαθĲΪĲİΝİηπσįδαΝİιαδĲέαμ εΪπκδαμΝ 
ηαελσξλκθβμΝαıγΫθİδαμΝάΝαįυθαηέαμ,ΝαθαπβλέαμΝά εΪπκδκυΝπλκίζάηαĲκμΝουξδεάμΝυΰİέαμ; 
ǼΪθΝθαδ,ΝπκζτΝάΝıİΝεΪπκδκΝίαγησ; (παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİΝαθΪζκΰα) 
 
Ναδ,Ν
πκζτ 
Ναδ,Νıİ εΪπκδκΝΝ
ίαγησ 
Όξδ 
 
ΕΡέ 1έίγ ΚαπθέαİĲİΝάΝεαπθέααĲİΝπκĲΫν (παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİΝαθΪζκΰα) 
 
ΚαπθέαπΝ
εαγβηİλδθΪ 
ΚαπθέαπΝ
πİλδıĲαıδαεΪΝ 
ǻİθΝεαπθέαπ,Ν
αζζΪΝεΪπθδααΝΝ
εαγβηİλδθΪ 
ǻİθΝεαπθέαπ,Ν
αζζΪΝεΪπθδααΝΝ
πİλδıĲαıδαεΪ 
ΠκĲΫΝ
įİθΝΝ
εΪπθδαα 
 
ΕΡέ 1έί4 ǼΪθΝεαπθέαİĲİ,ΝπσıαΝĲıδΰΪλαΝεαπθέαİĲİΝεαĲΪΝηΫıκθΝσλκΝĲβθΝβηΫλαν 
(παλαεαζυΝıβηİδυıĲİΝΝĲκθΝαλδγησΝĲıδΰΪλπθ) 
 
ΕΡέ 1έίη ΠσıİμΝηκθΪįİμΝαζεκσζΝπέθİĲİΝĲβθΝİίįκηΪįανΝ(ηδαΝηκθΪįα αζεκσζ 
αθĲδıĲκδξİέΝηİΝΫθαΝηδελσΝπκĲάλδΝĲκυΝελαıδκτ,ΝΫθαΝηİıαέκ πκĲάλδΝĲβμΝηπτλαμΝάΝΫθαΝπκĲσΝ
σππμΝκυέıευ,ΝίσĲεαΝεĲζέ). 
 
 
 
 
ΕΡέ 1έίθ ΠσıİμΝ υλİμΝ İίįκηαįδαέπμΝ ικįİτİĲİΝ ıυθάγπμΝ ıİΝ ηΫĲλδİμΝ ıπηαĲδεΫμΝ
įλαıĲβλδσĲβĲİμνΝ Ωμ ıπηαĲδεάΝ įλαıĲβλδσĲβĲαΝ γİπλκτηİΝ κπκδαįάπκĲİΝ ηΫĲλδαΝ ıπηαĲδεάΝ
įλαıĲβλδσĲβĲαΝπκυΝįδαλεİέΝΰδαΝĲκυζΪξδıĲκθΝζίΝıυθİξσηİθα ζİπĲΪΝ(σππμΝĲκΝπİλπΪĲβηα,ΝĲκΝ
εαγΪλδıηα,ΝĲβθΝεβπκυλδεά)έ 
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ΕΡέ 1έίι ΠσıİμΝ υλİμΝ İίįκηαįδαέπμΝ ικįİτİĲİΝ ıυθάγπμΝ ıİΝ ΫθĲκθİμ ıπηαĲδεΫμΝ
įλαıĲβλδσĲβĲİμνΝ ΩμΝ ıπηαĲδεάΝ įλαıĲβλδσĲβĲα γİπλκτηİ κπκδαįάπκĲİΝ ΫθĲκθβ ıπηαĲδεάΝ
įλαıĲβλδσĲβĲαΝπκυΝįδαλεİέΝΰδαΝ ĲκυζΪξδıĲκθΝζίΝıυθİξσηİθαΝζİπĲΪ (σππμ ĲκΝπκįάζαĲκ,Ν ĲκΝ
ΰλάΰκλκΝ πİλπΪĲβηα,Ν ĲκΝ ΰυηθαıĲάλδκ, ĲβθΝ αİλκίδεάΝ ΰυηθαıĲδεά, Ĳβθ εκζτηίβıβ,Ν ĲκΝ
πκįσıφαδλκΝεέζπέ)έ 
 
 
ΕΡέ 1έίκ ΠαλαεαζυΝυπκįİέιĲİΝİΪθΝεΪγİΝηδαΝαπσΝĲδμΝαεσζκυγİμΝįβζυıİδμΝδıξτİδΝάΝσξδΝσıκθΝ
αφκλΪ ĲβΝıυηπİλδφκλΪΝıαμμ (ίΪζĲİΝΧΝıĲβθΝαθĲέıĲκδξβΝıĲάζβ) 
 
΢υηφπθυ 
απσζυĲα ΢υηφωθυ 
ǼιαλĲΪĲαδ ǻδαφπθυ  ǻδαφπθυ 
απσζυĲα 
αέ   ǻİθΝζαηίΪθπΝπκĲΫΝαπσφαıβΝ
ΰδαΝĲβθΝκπκέαΝγαΝηİĲαθκδυıπΝ
ıĲκ ηΫζζκθ 
     
ίέ   ǻİθΝηπκλυΝπκĲΫΝθαΝ
πλκıįδκλέıπΝπκδαΝİπδζκΰάΝ
İέθαδΝεαζτĲİλβΝΰδαΝηΫθα 
     
ΰέ   ǾΝαπάΝİέθαδΝıαθΝĲκΝζαξİέκέΝΣκΝ
θαΝİέıαδΝİυĲυξάμ,ΝİέθαδΝαπζυμΝ
αάĲβηαΝĲτξβμ 
     
įέ   ΟδΝπλκίζΫοİδμΝηκυΝİέθαδΝπΪθĲαΝ
ıπıĲΫμ 
     
 
 
ΕΡέ 1έίλ ǻυıĲİΝΫθαΝπκıκıĲσΝıİΝεΪγİΝηδαΝαπσΝĲδμΝαεσζκυγİμΝİλπĲάıİδμμ 
 ΠκıκıĲσΝ
(%) 
αέΝΝΝΠκδκΝπκıκıĲσΝαθγλυππθΝĲβμΝβζδεέαμΝıαμΝΫξİδΝεαζτĲİλβΝİλΰαıέαΝαπσΝ
ıαμ, İιαδĲέαμΝεαζτĲİλπθΝİφκįέπθ; 
 
ίέΝΝΝΠκδκΝπκıκıĲσΝĲπθΝΰİδĲσθπθΝıαμΝγαΝπİĲτξİδΝεαζτĲİλαΝıĲβΝαπάΝσĲαθΝ
ıυΰελδγİέΝηααέΝıαμΝζσΰπΝεαζτĲİλπθΝδεαθκĲάĲπθΝĲκυμν 
 
ΰέΝΝΝΠκδκΝπκıκıĲσΝĲπθΝαθγλυππθΝĲβμΝβζδεέαμΝıαμΝΫξİδΝυοβζσĲİλİμΝ
απκįκξΫμΝΰδαΝεαζτĲİλβΝαπσįκıβΝıĲβΝįκυζİδΪΝĲκυμν  
 
 
 
 
 
ΕΡ. 1.10 ΠυμΝίζΫππΝĲκθΝİαυĲσΝηκυμ (ίΪζĲİΝΧΝıĲβθΝαθĲέıĲκδξβΝıĲάζβ) 
 
΢υηφπθυΝ
απσζυĲα  
΢υηφωθ
υ 
ǻİθΝ
İέηαδΝ
ίΫίαδκμ 
 
ǻδαφπθυ 
ǻδαφπθυΝ
απσζυĲα 
αέΝΝΝΝǼέηαδΝĲκζηβλσΝΪĲκηκ πκυΝ
įδαĲλΫξİδΝΰİθδεΪΝεδθįτθκυμέ      
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ίέΝΝΝΝΝΠαέλθπΝΝπλπĲκίκυζέα,Ν
αθααβĲυθĲαμΝΝİυεαδλέİμΝαεσηαΝ
εαδΝσĲαθΝİθΫξκυθΝεΪπκδκΝεέθįυθκέ 
     
ΰέ     ǼέηαδΝπλκıİεĲδεσΝΪĲκηκ πκυΝ
απκφİτΰİδΝΰİθδεΪΝĲκυμΝεδθįτθκυμέ      
į.    ΚΪθπΝπλΪΰηαĲαΝπΪθĲαΝηİΝ
αıφΪζİδαΝαεσηα εδΝαθΝıβηαέθİδΝ
πİλδıĲαıδαεΪΝσĲδΝηπκλİέΝθαΝξΪıπΝ
ηδαΝεαζάΝİυεαδλέαέ 
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ΕΡέ 1.11. Παλαεαζυ,Ν ΰδαΝ εΪγİΝ ηδαΝ απσΝ ĲδμΝ αεσζκυγİμΝ ıİδλΫμ,Ν εΪγİΝ ηδαΝ απσΝ ĲδμΝ κπκέİμΝ
πİλδΫξİδΝΫθαΝαİυΰΪλδ υπκγİĲδευθ İθαζζαεĲδευθΝζαξθυθ,ΝİπδζΫιĲİΝĲκθΝζαξθσΝπκυΝπλκĲδηΪĲİΝ
ηİĲαιτΝĲκυΝǹΝεαδΝĲκυΝǺέ ΟΝζαξθσμΝǹΝıαμΝįέθİδΝİέĲİΝβίίΝ€ ά 1θίΝ€ ηİΝεΪπκδİμΝπδγαθσĲβĲİμΝ
πκυΝαζζΪακυθΝıĲαįδαεΪΝıİΝεΪγİΝıİδλΪέΝΟΝζαξθσμΝǺΝıαμΝįέθİδΝİέĲİΝγκηΝ€ΝİέĲİ 1ίΝ€ΝηİΝεΪπκδİμΝ
πδγαθσĲβĲİμΝπκυΝİπέıβμΝαζζΪακυθΝıĲαįδαεΪΝıİΝεΪγİΝıİδλΪέΝ ΓδαΝπαλΪįİδΰηα,ΝıĲβΝıİδλΪΝ1,ΝκΝ
ζαξθσμΝǹΝıαμΝįέθİδΝβίίΝ€ΝηİΝπδγαθσĲβĲαΝ1ίΣΝεαδ 1θίΝ€ΝηİΝπδγαθσĲβĲαΝλίΣ,ΝİθυΝκΝζαξθσμΝǺΝ
ıαμΝįέθİδΝγκηΝ€Νηİ πδγαθσĲβĲαΝ1ίΣΝεαδΝ1ίΝ€ΝηİΝπδγαθσĲβĲαΝλίΣέΝΠαλαεαζυ,ΝİπδζΫιĲİ ΰδαΝ
εΪγİΝıİδλΪ ĲκΝζαξθσΝπκυΝπλκĲδηΪĲİ, ευεζυθκθĲαμΝİέĲİΝĲκΝǹΝİέĲİΝĲκΝǺΝıĲβθΝĲİζİυĲαέαΝıĲάζβ. 
ΘυηβγİέĲİΝ σĲδΝ įİθΝ υπΪλξκυθΝ ıπıĲΫμΝ άΝ ζαθγαıηΫθİμΝ απαθĲάıİδμέΝ ǼέθαδΝ κδΝ πλκıππδεΫμΝ
İπδζκΰΫμΝıαμΝπκυΝηαμΝİθįδαφΫλκυθ. 
 αήα ȁαχνόȢ ǹ ȁαχνόȢ Ǻ Η ΕπιλογȒ σαȢ 
 Π € Π € Π € Π € ǹ Ǻ 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 ǹ Ǻ 
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ΕΡέ 1έ12 Παλαεαζυ,Ν ΰδαΝ εΪγİΝ ηδαΝ απσΝ ĲδμΝ αεσζκυγİμΝ ıİδλΫμ,Ν εΪγİΝ ηδαΝ απσΝ ĲδμΝ κπκέİμΝ
πİλδΫξİδΝ ΫθαΝ αİυΰΪλδΝ υπκγİĲδευθΝ İθαζζαεĲδευθΝ İπδζκΰυθ,Ν İπδζΫιĲİΝ αυĲάΝ πκυΝ πλκĲδηΪĲİΝ
ηİĲαιτΝ ĲβμΝ İπδζκΰάμΝ ǹΝ εαδΝ ĲβμΝ İπδζκΰάμΝ ǺέΝ ΚαδΝ κδΝ įτκΝ İπδζκΰΫμΝ ıαμΝ įέθκυθΝ κλδıηΫθİμΝ
ξλβηαĲδεΫμΝ πζβλπηΫμ. ΟδΝ πζβλπηΫμΝ ıĲβθΝ İπδζκΰάΝ ǹΝ γα ΰέθκυθΝ ıĲκΝ ηΫζζκθΝ (σππμΝ
υπκįİδεθτİĲαδΝ ıİΝ εΪγİΝ ıİδλΪ)Ν İθυΝ κδΝ πζβλπηΫμΝ ıĲβθΝ İπδζκΰάΝ ǺΝ ΰέθκθĲαδΝ ıάηİλαέΝ
Παλαεαζυ,ΝΰδαΝεΪγİΝıİδλΪΝİπδζΫιĲİΝπκδαΝαπσΝĲδμΝİπδζκΰΫμΝǹΝάΝǺΝπλκĲδηΪĲİ,ΝευεζυθκθĲαμΝ
İέĲİΝ ĲκΝ ǹΝ İέĲİΝ ĲκΝ ǺΝ ıĲβθΝ ĲİζİυĲαέαΝ ıĲάζβέΝ ΘυηβγİέĲİΝ σĲδΝ įİθΝ υπΪλξκυθΝ ıπıĲΫμΝ άΝ
ζαθγαıηΫθİμ απαθĲάıİδμέΝǼέθαδ κδΝπλκıππδεΫμΝİπδζκΰΫμΝıαμΝπκυΝηαμΝİθįδαφΫλκυθέ 
 
αήα Επδζοΰά A                  Επδζοΰά B Η Επδζοΰά 
1 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ60 €Νıάηİλα A B 
2 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ120 €Νıάηİλα A B 
3 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ180 €Νıάηİλα A B 
4 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ240 €Νıάηİλα A B 
5 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ300 €Νıάηİλα A B 
 
 
    
6 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ60 €Νıάηİλα A B 
7 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ120 €Νıάηİλα A B 
8 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ180 €Νıάηİλα A B 
9 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ240 €Νıάηİλα A B 
10 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ300 €Νıάηİλα A B 
     
11 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ60 €Νıάηİλα A B 
12 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ120 €Νıάηİλα A B 
13 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ180 €Νıάηİλα A B 
14 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ240 €Νıάηİλα A B 
15 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ360 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ300 €Νıάηİλα A B 
     
16 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ150 €Νıάηİλα A B 
17 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ300 €Νıάηİλα A B 
18 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ450 €Νıάηİλα A B 
19 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ600 €Νıάηİλα A B 
20 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 € ıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ750 €Νıάηİλα A B 
     
21 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ150 €Νıάηİλα A B 
22 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ300 €Νıάηİλα A B 
23 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ450 €Νıάηİλα A B 
24 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ600 €Νıάηİλα A B 
25 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝ1Νηάθα ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ750 €Νıάηİλα A B 
     
26 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ150 €Νıάηİλα A B 
27 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ300 €Νıάηİλα A B 
28 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ450 €Νıάηİλα A B 
29 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ600 €Νıάηİλα A B 
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30 ΘαΝζΪίİĲİΝ900 €ΝıİΝγΝηάθİs ΛαηίΪθİĲİΝ750 €Νıάηİλα A B 
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ΕΡέ 1.13. ΠαλαεαζυΝıεİφĲİέĲİΝ ĲαΝαεσζκυγαΝυπκγİĲδεΪΝıİθΪλδαέΝΤπκγΫıĲİΝσĲδΝπλΫπİδΝ θαΝ
İπδζΫιİĲİΝ ηİĲαιτΝ įτκΝ γİλαπİδυθ,Ν ǹΝ εαδΝ Ǻ,Ν ıξİĲδεΪΝ ηİΝ ΫθαΝ πλσίζβηαΝ υΰİέαμΝ πκυΝ ıαμΝ
απαıξκζİέέΝ ǾΝ İπέįλαıβΝ ĲβμΝ γİλαπİέαμΝ ǹΝ įδαλεİέΝ İέĲİΝ βίίΝ ηΫλİμΝ İέĲİΝ 1θίΝ ηΫλİμΝ εΪπκδİμΝ
πδγαθσĲβĲİμΝπκυΝαζζΪακυθΝıĲαįδαεΪΝıİΝεΪγİΝıİδλΪέΝǾΝİπέįλαıβΝĲβμΝγİλαπİέαμΝǺΝįδαλεİέΝ
İέĲİΝγκηΝηΫλİμΝİέĲİΝ1ίΝηΫλİμΝηİΝεΪπκδİμΝπδγαθσĲβĲİμΝπκυΝİπέıβμ αζζΪακυθΝıĲαįδαεΪΝıİΝεΪγİΝ
ıİδλΪέΝǼıİέμ ιΫλİĲİΝĲδμΝπδγαθσĲβĲİμΝηİΝĲδμΝκπκέİμΝαυĲσΝγαΝıυηίİέέΝǹθİιΪλĲβĲαΝαπσΝĲκΝπκδαΝ
γİλαπİέαΝΝİπδζΫιİĲİ,ΝΰδαΝσıκΝξλκθδεσΝįδΪıĲβηαΝįδαλεİέΝβΝİπέįλαıάΝĲκυμΝγαΝİέıĲİΝıİΝπζάλβΝ
υΰİέαέΝΑφσĲου πİλΪıİδ β İπέįλαıβ, İπδıĲλΫφİĲİ ıĲβθ αλχδεά εαĲΪıĲαıβ υΰİέαμ ıαμ 
εαδ ıĲδμ įτο πİλδπĲυıİδμ εαδ įİθ ηπολİέĲİ θα ζΪίİĲİ Ϊζζβ αΰωΰά.  
 
ΓδαΝ παλΪįİδΰηα,Ν ıĲβΝ ıİδλΪΝ 1,Ν βΝ γİλαπİέαΝǹΝ γαΝ ıαμΝ įυıİδΝ βίίΝ ηΫλİμΝ πζάλκυμΝ υΰİέαμΝ ηİΝ
πδγαθσĲβĲαΝ1ίΣΝάΝ1θίΝηΫλİμ πζάλκυμΝυΰİέαμΝηİΝπδγαθσĲβĲαΝλίΣέΝǾΝγİλαπİέαΝǺΝıαμΝįέθİδΝ
3κηΝηΫλİμ πζάλκυμΝυΰİέαμΝηİΝπδγαθσĲβĲαΝ1ίΣΝάΝ1ίΝηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝηİΝπδγαθσĲβĲαΝ
90%.  
 
Παλαεαζυ,ΝεΪθĲİΝĲβθΝİπδζκΰάΝıαμΝΰδαΝεΪγİΝıİδλΪ,ΝευεζυθκθĲαμΝİέĲİΝαπσΝĲκΝǹΝİέĲİΝ ĲκΝǺΝ
ıĲβθΝ ĲİζİυĲαέαΝ ıĲάζβέΝ ΘυηβγİέĲİΝ σĲδΝ įİθΝ υπΪλξκυθΝ ıπıĲΫμΝ άΝ ζαθγαıηΫθİμΝ απαθĲάıİδμέΝ
ǼέθαδΝκδΝπλκıππδεΫμΝİπδζκΰΫμΝıαμΝπκυΝηαμΝİθįδαφΫλκυθέ 
 
 Θεραπεȓα ǹ Θεραπεȓα Ǻ ΕπιλογȒ  
 Π ȂȒνεȢ σε  
πλȒȡη υγεȓα 
Π ȂȒνεȢ σε 
πλȒȡη υγεȓα 
Π ȂȒνεȢ σε 
πλȒȡη υγεȓα 
Π ȂȒνεȢ σε  
πλȒȡη 
υγεȓα 
ǹ Ǻ 
1 10% 200 ηΫλİμ 90% 1θί ηΫλİμ 10% 385 ηΫλİμ  90% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
2 20% 200 ηΫλİμ  80% 1θί ηΫλİμ 20% 385 ηΫλİμ  80% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
3 30% 200 ηΫλİμ  70% 1θί ηΫλİμ 30% 385 ηΫλİμ  70% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
4 40% 200 ηΫλİμ  60% 1θί ηΫλİμ  40% 385 ηΫλİμ  60% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
5 50% 200 ηΫλİμ  50% 1θί ηΫλİμ  50% 385 ηΫλİμ  50% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
6 60% 200 ηΫλİμ 40% 1θί ηΫλİμ  60% 385 ηΫλİμ  40% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
7 70% 200 ηΫλİμ  30% 1θί ηΫλİμ  70% 385 ηΫλİμ  30% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
8 80% 200 ηΫλİμ  20% 1θί ηΫλİμ 80% 385 ηΫλİμ  20% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
9 90% 200 ηΫλİμ 10% 1θί ηΫλİμ 90% 385 ηΫλİμ 10% 10 ηΫλİμ ǹ Ǻ 
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ΕΡέ 1έ14 ǼιİĲΪıĲİΝ ĲαΝ αεσζκυγαΝ υπκγİĲδεΪΝ ıİθΪλδαέΝ ΤπκγΫıĲİΝ σĲδΝ ΫξİĲİΝ ΫθαΝ πλσίζβηαΝ
υΰİέαμΝ πκυΝ ıαμΝ απαıξκζİέέΝ ΜπκλİέĲİΝ θαΝ İπδζΫιİĲİ ηİĲαιτΝ įτκΝ γİλαπİδυθ,Ν ǹΝ εαδΝ Ǻ. ǾΝ
γİλαπİέαΝχΝİέθαδΝįδαγΫıδηβΝıİΝεΪπκδαΝıĲδΰηάΝıĲκΝηΫζζκθΝİθυΝβΝǺΝİέθαδΝįδαγΫıδηβΝıάηİλαέΝ
ΌĲαθΝ αλξέıİĲİΝ ĲβΝ γİλαπİέα,Ν αθİιΪλĲβĲαΝ απσΝ ĲκΝ πσĲİΝ αυĲάΝ γαΝ ιİεδθάıİδ,Ν βΝ İπέįλαıβΝ γαΝ
įδαλεİέΝ ΰδαΝ σıκΝ įδΪıĲβηαΝ αθαφΫλİĲαδΝ ıİΝ εΪγİΝ İπδζκΰάέΝ ΓδαΝ παλΪįİδΰηα,Ν ıĲβθΝ πλυĲβΝ
İπδζκΰά,Ν βΝ γİλαπİέαΝ ǹΝ γαΝ ıαμΝ φΫλİδΝ ıİ πζάλβΝ υΰİέα ΰδαΝ γθίΝ ηΫλİμΝ ιİεδθυθĲαμΝ ıİΝ ηδαΝ
İίįκηΪįα,ΝİθυΝβΝǺ γαΝıαμΝφΫλİδΝıİΝθίΝηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝαπσΝıάηİλα. ΢Ĳο 
ĲΫζομ Ĳβμ γİλαπİέαμ İπδıĲλΫφİĲİ ıĲβθ αλχδεά ıαμ εαĲΪıĲαıβ, įβζαįά Ĳβθ εαĲΪıĲαıά 
ıαμ πλοĲοτ αλχέıİĲİ Ĳβθ γİλαπİέα, εαδ įİθ ηπολİέĲİ θα ζΪίİĲİ Ϊζζβ αΰωΰά.  
 
ǻİθΝυπΪλξİδΝεαηέαΝΪζζβΝįδαφκλΪΝηİĲαιτΝĲπθΝįτκΝγİλαπİδυθέΝΠαλαεαζυ,ΝΰδαΝεΪγİΝηδαΝαπσΝ
ĲδμΝ αεσζκυγİμΝ ıİδλΫμ,Ν İπδζΫιĲİΝ αυĲάΝ πκυΝ πλκĲδηΪĲİΝ ηİĲαιτΝ ĲβμΝ γİλαπİέαμΝ ǹΝ εαδΝ ĲβμΝ
γİλαπİέαμΝǺέΝΠαλαεαζυ,ΝεΪθĲİΝ ĲβθΝ İπδζκΰάΝıαμΝ ΰδαΝεΪγİΝıİδλΪ,ΝευεζυθκθĲαμΝ Ν İέĲİΝ ĲκΝǹΝ
İέĲİΝ ĲκΝ ǺΝ ıĲβθΝ ĲİζİυĲαέαΝ ıĲάζβέ ΘυηβγİέĲİΝ σĲδΝ įİθΝ υπΪλξκυθΝ ıπıĲΫμΝ άΝ ζαθγαıηΫθİμΝ
απαθĲάıİδμέΝǼέθαδΝκδΝπλκıππδεΫμΝİπδζκΰΫμΝıαμΝπκυΝηαμΝİθįδαφΫλκυθέ 
 
αή
α Θİλαπİέα A Θİλαπİέα B Ǽπδ-ζκΰάΝ 
1 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
60 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
2 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
120 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
3 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
180 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
4 
 360 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
240 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
5 
 360 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
300 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
     
6 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
60 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
7 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİ1ΝηάθαΝ 
120 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
8 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
180 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
9 
 360 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
240 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
10 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
300 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
     
11 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
60 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
12 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
120 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
13 
 360 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
180 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
14 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
240 ηΫλİμΝΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
15 
 360 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
300 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
     
16 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ 150 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ A B 
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ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
17 
 900 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
300 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
18 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
450 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
19 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
600 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
20 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝίįκηΪįα 
750 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
     
21 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
150 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
22 
 900 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1Νηάθα 
300 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
23 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
450 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
24 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
600 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
25 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝ1ΝηάθαΝ 
750 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
     
26 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
150 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
27 
 900 ηΫλİμ ıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
300 ηΫλİμΝΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
28 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
450 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
29 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
600 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
30 
 900 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβΝυΰİέαΝιİεδθυθĲαμΝ
ĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıİΝγΝηάθİμΝ 
750 ηΫλİμΝıİΝπζάλβ υΰİέαΝ
ιİεδθυθĲαμΝĲβΝγİλαπİέαΝıάηİλα 
A B 
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Γδα ıĲαĲδıĲδεοτμ ζσΰουμ γα γΫζαηİ θα ıαμ λωĲάıουηİ … 
ΕΡέ 1έ15 ΠκδαΝİέθαδΝβΝβηİλκηβθέαΝΰΫθθβıάμΝ
ıαμν 
 
ΕΡέ 1έ16 Πκδκ İέθαδΝĲκΝφτζκΝıαμνΝ(παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİ αθΪζκΰα) 
 
ΆθĲλαμ Γυθαέεα 
 
ΕΡέ 1.17 ΠκδκΝİέθαδΝĲκΝαθυĲαĲκΝİπέπİįκΝİεπαέįİυıβμΝπκυΝΫξİĲİΝκζκεζβλυıİδνΝ  (παλαεαζυΝ
ευεζυıĲİ) 
αέ ΠκĲΫΝηκυΝįİθΝπάΰαΝıξκζİέκ 
ίέ ǻβηκĲδεσΝ΢ξκζİέκ 
ΰέ γĲΪιδκυΝΓυηθΪıδκ 
įέ ΛτεİδκΝάΝθĲΪιδκΝΓυηθΪıδκ 
İέ ΙǼΚήΣİξθδεάΝ΢ξκζά 
ıĲ. ΣǼΙ 
αέ ǹǼΙ 
βέ ΜİĲαπĲυξδαεΫμΝıπκυįΫμΝ 
 
ΕΡέ 1.18 ΠκδαΝİέθαδΝβΝκδεκΰİθİδαεάΝıαμΝεαĲΪıĲαıβνΝ(παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİ) 
 
Άΰαηκμ ΠαθĲλİηΫθκμ ǻδααİυΰηΫθκμ Χάλκμήα 
 
 
ΕΡέ 1έ19 ΈξİĲİΝπαδįδΪνΝ(παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİ αθΪζκΰα) 
 
Ναδ Όξδ 
 
ΕΡέ 1έβ0 ΜΫθİĲİΝησθκδΝαυĲάθΝĲβθΝπİλέκįκνΝ(παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİ αθΪζκΰα) 
 
Ναδ Όξδ 
 
ΕΡέ 1.21 ΠκδİμΝαπσΝĲδμΝαεσζκυγİμΝπİλδΰλαφΫμΝıαμΝαπκįέįκυθΝεαζτĲİλαΝΰδαΝĲκΝπυμΝ
αδıγΪθİıĲİΝΰδαΝĲκΝκδεδαεσΝİδıσįβηΪΝıαμΝıάηİλανΝ(ıβηİδυıĲİΝηİΝΧ) 
 
ǽπΝΪθİĲαΝηİΝĲκΝπαλσθΝİδıσįβηα  
   ΣαΝεαĲαφΫλθπΝηİΝĲκΝπαλσθΝİδıσįβηα  
ΣαΝίΰΪαπΝπΫλαΝįτıεκζα ηİΝĲκΝπαλσθΝİδıσįβηα  
Σκ ίΰΪαπΝπΫλαΝπκζτΝįτıεκζα ηİΝĲκΝπαλσθΝİδıσįβηα  
 (ǻǹ)  
 
ΕΡέ 1.22 ΣκΝηβθδαέκΝαĲκηδεσΝİδıσįβηΪΝıαμ,Νİέθαδμ (παλαεαζυΝευεζυıĲİ) 
 
ΛδΰσĲİλκΝαπσΝ
6ίίΝǼυλυ 
600-1000 
Ǽυλυ 
1001-1500 
Ǽυλυ 
1501-2000 
Ǽυλυ 
2001-3000 
Ǽυλυ 
ΠİλδııσĲİλαΝαπσΝ
γίίίΝǼυλυ 
 
΢Α΢ ΕΤΧΑΡΙ΢ΣΟΤΜΕ ΠΟΛΤ 
 
 
ǾηΫλα Μάθαμ ΈĲκμ 
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Online Appendix B - Comparing the finance and health domains 
The conversion rate between one unit of money and of time in full health was a key 
consideration in our methodological discussion. Our main objective was to choose lengths of 
time in full health that were conspicuous and realistic for some hypothetical healthcare 
treatments. A natural and intuitive choice was to use days in full health as unitary interval in 
the health domain. The implicit conversion rate between the financial and the health domain 
of one euro per day in full health was based on several considerations. 
 
In a nutshell, the implicit rate of conversion was based on the evidence from a pilot 
experiment run with a sample of patients from the same hospital having similar 
characteristics to the respondents in our experiment. As discussed, prior to finalizing the 
design of the main fieldwork, we conducted a pilot experiment involving 32 subjects 
attending a sub-set of outpatient clinics at the Laiko Hospital. In addition to checking the 
comprehension and general validity of the questionnaire, the aim of the pilot was also to 
gather information about the description of their current health states by the respondents, 
using the Euroqol EQ-5D classification, and to obtain estimate of the approximateΝ‘rate of 
substitution’ between money and days in full health by patients. 
 
In the pilot, subjects were first asked to self-assess their own health on the usual 1-5 Likert 
scale and to describe their current health states using the EQ-5D system, rating 5 distinct 
health-related dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, 
anxiety/depression) using 3-values scales (no, moderate, or severe problems). The EQ-5D 
has been extensively used in health economics as it allows one to summarise each health 
state using a 5-digit index, e.g., 11121 for a person who does not have any problem (level 1) 
except a moderate pain or discomfort in the fourth dimension (level 2). It also allows 
57 
 
attaching quality-of-lifeΝ ‘tariffs’ to each of the 243 possible scenarios as estimated from 
preferences over health states from representative samples of the general population (1).  
 
Half of the subjects in the pilot experiment were then given a questionnaire containing the 
experimental questions to elicit risk preferences in the finance domain first, followed by the 
questionnaire, and the tests for risk preferences in the health domain, while the order was 
reversed for the other half of the respondents. Further, subjects providedΝtheirΝ‘willingness-
to-pay’ for one day in full health using methods similar to Gyrd-Hansen (2) and Pinto-
Prades, Loomes and Brey (3).  
 
The results from the pilot experiment proved useful to gather insights to finalise the design 
of the main experiment. First, the domain order manipulation allowed us to gather informal 
insights on the general comprehension of the paired-lottery tests. When interacting with the 
research assistants, participants seemed to better understand the structure of the choice 
between healthcare treatments when they had previously answered analogous MPL tests 
with money. The final choice of presenting to all subjects the risky lotteries in finance 
before the ones in health was informed by this feedback from the pilot, as well as by the 
analogous design by Prosser and Wittenberg (4) who also present the monetary questions 
first. This design feature, however, does not allow us to explicitly account for possible order 
effects of responses across different domains: to do so, one should randomly allocate 
subjects to counterbalanced orders of the two lottery domains, an opportunity that was 
beyond our capability. 
 
Second, as expected for patients in outpatient clinics, most subjects described themselves as 
affected by health conditions characterized by only moderate pain or discomfort, anxiety or 
distress, in healthΝstatesΝcorrespondingΝtoΝtheΝ‘veryΝmild’ ones (e.g., 21111, 12111, 11211, 
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111β1,Ν 1111β)Ν orΝ theΝ ‘relativelyΝ mild’ ones (e.g., 12211, 12121, 11122, 22121, 22112, 
21222, 11311).  
 
The quality-of-life tariffs estimated from the Time Trade-Off (TTO) method associated to 
these health states varied between 0.556 (state 11311) and 0.883 (state 11211), with 1 being, 
by definition, the value attached to full health and 0 to death. We computed an average 
quality-of-life tariff for patients in our pilot as the average of the tariffs in each EQ-5D state 
weighted by the relative number of respondents (out of the 32 interviewed) who describe 
themselves as affected by that state, which returned a value of 0.751. 
 
In addition, the answers to the procedure designed by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (3) to 
elicitΝ theΝWTPΝ forΝ ζΝmonthsΝ inΝ fullΝ healthΝ indicatedΝ thatΝ virtuallyΝ allΝ subjects’ΝmaximumΝ
WTPs were included in the range between €βηΝ andΝ €ηίΝ aΝ month,Ν correspondingΝ toΝ aΝ
maximumΝexpenseΝofΝaboutΝ€γίί-600 a year. The average WTP for the medicine B in the 
pilotΝsampleΝwasΝ€ζβέζΝaΝmonth,ΝcorrespondingΝ toΝanΝexpenditureΝofΝ€ηίλΝaΝyear,Ν roughlyΝ
the amount of the basic monthly wage in Greece. As this maximum amount was traded by 
subjects in our pilot in exchange for 4 hypothetical months in full health, the monetary value 
attachedΝtoΝoneΝdayΝinΝfullΝhealthΝwasΝaboutΝ€ζέβζέΝThis figure is in line with the evidence 
from Spain by Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (3) who experimentally elicited and 
estimated the mean WTP to avoid 3 days in a health status characterized by a moderate pain 
or discomfort (state 11121 in EQ-ηϊ)ΝinΝ€1βέηέ14  
 
                                                 
14
 However, both figures are less directly comparable with alternative estimates for other countries using 
different methods: the estimated monetary value for one quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) typically span 
withinΝ aΝ rangeΝ betweenΝ ϊKKκκ,ίίίΝ (aboutΝ €1β,ίίί)Ν inΝ ϊenmarkΝ Ν (elicitingΝ WTPΝ forΝ aΝ QχδY (2)) and 
US$βζ,ιιιΝ (aboutΝ €1κ,ίίί)Ν inΝ theΝ USΝ (usingΝ theΝ humanΝ capitalΝ estimateΝ method (5)). These alternative 
estimatesΝimplicitlyΝattachΝtoΝoneΝdayΝinΝfullΝhealthΝaΝmonetaryΝvalueΝrangingΝfromΝaboutΝ€γγΝtoΝaboutΝ€ηίέ 
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TheΝ monetaryΝ valueΝ ofΝ aboutΝ €ζέβζΝ attachedΝ toΝ oneΝ dayΝ inΝ fullΝ health, thus, served as 
reference figure to estimate the additional amount of money that gives a marginal utility to 
subjects in our sample equal to the marginal utility of receiving one additional day in full 
health,ΝinΝorderΝtoΝkeepΝtheΝ‘marginalΝrateΝofΝsubstitution’ between the lotteries in the finance 
and health domain as close as possible to 1. In fact, the marginal utility attached by patients 
to the idea of receiving a hypothetical extra day in full health is the marginal benefit of 
moving from their actual health state to a state of full health for one day. If the utility per 
day is measured in terms of quality of life, consistent with the CUA approach and the 
construction of the quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) measure, the marginal utility of an 
additional day in full health is the difference between the quality-of-life tariff in full health 
and the one for the current health state, that is 1-0.751=0.249. Therefore, the monetary value 
associated to such a marginal utility can be estimated to be ίέβζλ*(€ζέβζ)Ν οΝ €1έίθ,Ν
suggesting that an additionalΝ euroΝ addedΝ toΝ theΝ individualΝ ‘mentalΝ account’ in the finance 
domain had approximately the same marginal utility of a hypothetical additional day in full 
health in the health domain. This finding was the main argument supporting our design 
choice to use a number of euros for the monetary lotteries directly corresponding to the 
number of days in full health in the health lotteries.  
 
While this one-to-one equivalence assumption has the further attraction of being a natural 
and intuitive option, it should be openly acknowledged that the correspondence of the 
outcomes across the two domains is a key assumption that clearly impacts the cross-domain 
comparisons. In particular, underlying our design choice under both the EUT and the RDU 
model is the assumption that subjects use a CRRA utility function. If, however, subjects use 
a non-constant RRA utility function, and, for instance, exhibit an increasing or decreasing 
RRA, then our assumed equivalence across domains introduces a major confounder in the 
analysis, and represents a critical limitation of the design.  
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Another clear limitation of our analysis is related to the sample selection. Together with the 
conceptual distinction between background and foreground risk in the money and health 
domains, the potential sample selection issue should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
cross-domain differences in risk preferences. The sample selection could indeed favour the 
observation that subjects in our sample show higher risk aversion in the health than in the 
financial domain. The different nature of background and foreground risk can instead work 
both ways (6). On the one hand, the addition of background risk from experiencing the 
economic crisis can make subjects more risk averse with respect to any independent risk in 
money and health, a phenomenon known as risk vulnerability (7). On the other hand, if 
subjects are already exposed to sufficiently high background risk, they might pay little 
attention to any additional, small, increase of risk, especially in money, consistently with the 
idea of diminishing sensitivity to risk (8). In principle, one could attempt to correct for such 
issues by comparing risk preference responses across domains between our sample of 
patients in outpatient clinics and another sample which is representative of the general 
population in Greece; or by comparing those two groups with a third sample of subjects 
recruitedΝinΝaΝ‘reverse’ΝsettingΝ- e.g. an employment benefit centre - where they are likely to 
feel apprehensive in the financial domain. More research is needed to systematically assess 
the robustness of similarities and differences of risk preferences across domains using a 
range of different conversion values and subject pools. 
 
While such possibilities were beyond the scope of our study, in our econometric analysis we 
controlled for individual heterogeneity in the relative cross-domain wellbeing, by including 
individual responses to questions assessing the self-reported baseline levels of the health 
status, as well as of the income and financial conditions. 
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Online Appendix C - Econometric approach  
 
To empirically estimate risk preferences we follow the Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
econometric approach by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (9–11) and Harrison and 
Rutström (12). In particular, we adapt the Stata template code in Harrison and Rutström 
(13). In a nutshell, the ML approach estimates the latent risk preference parameters by 
calculating the likelihood of picking one specific lottery in each question, given its induced 
probabilities and outcomes. More in detail, using a CRRA utility function  and 
the probabilities  for each outcome  induced by the experiment (depending on the 
domain of the choice, either a monetary outcome or a health outcome ), the expected 
utility (EU) for lottery i is given by (1): 
 
 (1) 
 
Based on a candidate value of  a latent preference index  can be constructed. We use 
the simple stochastic specification by and Holt and Laury (2002), allowing some behavioral 
Fechner errors in the sense of Hey and Orme (14),Ν andΝ alsoΝ accountingΝ forΝ ‘contextualΝ
errors’ΝinΝtheΝsenseΝofΝWilcox (15): for each lottery pair, the EU for each lottery is calculated 
for candidate estimates of r and , and the ratio (2) 
 
  (2) 
 
is calculated, where EUA refers to Option A and EUB to Option B;  is a normalizing 
‘contextual’Ν termΝdefinedΝasΝtheΝmaximumΝutilityΝoverΝallΝprizesΝinΝ thatΝ lotteryΝpair,ΝminusΝ
the minimum utility over all prizes in that lottery pair, varying, in principle, from lottery pair 
to lottery pair, and ensuring that the normalized difference in expected utility remains in the 
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unit interval; and, finally,  isΝaΝstructuralΝ‘noiseΝparameter’ΝusedΝtoΝallowΝsomeΝerrorsΝfromΝ
the perspective of the deterministic EUT model. In particular, as  this specification 
collapses to the deterministic choice EUT model, where the individual choice is strictly 
determined by the expected utilities of the two lotteries, but as  gets larger the choice 
becomes random. When  the above specification reduces to one where the probability 
of picking one lottery is given by the ratio of the expected utility of one lottery to the sum of 
the expected utilities ofΝbothΝlotteriesΝ(adjustedΝbyΝtheΝ‘contextual’Νterm)έ 
 
The latent index  is in the form of a cumulative probability distribution function defined 
over differences in the expected utilities ofΝtheΝtwoΝlotteries,ΝtheΝ‘contextual’ΝtermΝ , and the 
‘noise’ΝparameterΝ . The latent index function, based on latent preferences, is then linked to 
observed choices using a logistic cumulative probability distribution function . This 
‘logit’-type function takes any argument and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1, so 
that prob(choose lottery A) = .  
 
Thus the likelihood of the risk preferences responses depends on the estimates of r and , 
and on the observed choices. Since, in our experimental tasks, subjects could not manifest 
indifference between the two options, the conditional log-likelihood function is (3): 
 
 (3) 
 
Where  denotes lottery B and  denotes lottery A in a risk preferences task i.  
 
As mentioned, in our estimates we pool all observations together and include a categorical 
variableΝ(‘H’)ΝtoΝcontrolΝforΝwhetherΝtheΝresponsesΝreferΝtoΝtheΝfinancialΝ(H= 0) or the health 
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domains (H= 1). Thus, we extend the log-likelihood function above soΝthatΝtheΝ‘r’ΝparameterΝ
of risk aversion is a function of the domainΝ (‘H’),Ν ofΝ theΝ roundΝofΝdataΝ collection,Ν andΝofΝ
other observable individual characteristics, including income, health, gender and age: that is, 
in the log-likelihood function (4),   where r0 is a fixed 
parameter; H is the health domain variable; c is the effect associated to the health domain 
variable; T is a vector of time variables for the rounds of data collection; D is a vector of 
effects associated with each round of data collection; X is a vector of individual 
characteristics; and E is a vector of effects associated with each characteristic in the variable 
vector X. In this empirical model, therefore, the individual characteristics variables are 
allowed to affect only overall risk preferences, and not each risk domain separately.  
 
The log-likelihood function is then maximized using the Newton-Raphson optimization 
technique (for a detailed treatment on ML estimation using Stata, see (16)). We correct for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of observations within the same subject, by treating 
the residuals from the same subject as potentially correlated, and computing cluster-robust 
standard errors of estimates.  
 
As mentioned, besides the estimates obtained under the EUT assumption, we also re-
estimate the empirical model considering CRRA risk preferences within the Rank 
Dependent Utility (RDU) model by Quiggin (8). RDU is a generalization of EUT that allows 
subjects to transform the objective probabilities presented in lotteries and to use these 
weighted probabilities as decision weights in the evaluation of the lotteries. In particular, we 
consider theΝ‘power’ΝprobabilityΝweightingΝfunctionΝw(p)ΝproposedΝbyΝQuiggin (8) which is 
definedΝoverΝaΝuniqueΝ‘curvature’ΝparameterΝyμΝw(p)οpy. When y≠1 the RDU model deviates 
fromΝ theΝEUTΝmodelμΝ concavityΝ andΝ convexityΝ ofΝw(p)Ν areΝ saidΝ toΝ reflectΝ ‘optimism’Ν andΝ
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‘pessimism’,Νrespectively,ΝinΝhowΝaΝsubjectΝperceivesΝobjectiveΝprobabilitiesέ The estimation 
steps described above can be readily modified by replacing the EUT with the RDU model. 
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